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Introduction
Introduction
Motivation for the paper
Main question: How may universities strategic behavior affect the provision
of higher education and at what price?
Universities are confronted with a new environment characterized by:
a harmonization of higher education systems with the Bologna process (more
specifically in undergraduate studies),
an increased mobility of students,
a greater autonomy granted to universities
This change is likely to get universities to engage in competition on the
enrollment market.
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Introduction
Motivation for the paper
How can universities compete for students?
compete by setting tuition fees,
compete by setting the number of students enrolled,
compete by differentiation in curriculum and/or in other non-price dimensions
(location, services...).
Stylized facts Fig
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Introduction
Introduction
Another stylized fact:
Over the last 15 years, most European countries have changed their legislation
concerning their tuition fee policy,
Tuition fee deregulation has led to increasing fees combined with relaxed
controls on the number of students each university can enroll.
In the UK: following the reform (2012), fees have more than tripled.
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Introduction
How can we explain disparities on tuition fees between countries?
How can we explain the high level of tuition fees following the liberalization
of tuition fees in some countries?
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Introduction
Preview of the model
Two competition strategies:
1 Bertrand competition: a competition strategy where universities compete in
terms of price: they set their own fees (as in the UK, the USA, Canada and
Australia)
2 Cournot competition: a competition strategy where universities compete in
terms of quantity: they decide on the number of students enrolled (as in
France, Italy, and Germany among others)
The fact that universities pursue both teaching and research objectives
affects how they compete for students:
Students are at once inputs and clients of the educational process (Rotchschild
and White, 1995)
students are required for the production of education,
they also provide funds to universities both by paying tuition fees, and by
allowing universities to receive transfers from government.
Research requires money; more students enrolled may imply an increased
research budget. But, increasing the size of the population of students may be
costly.
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Introduction
Related literature
Theoretical papers focus on:
1 the performance of universities in terms of costs and returns to higher
education (Garcia-Penalosa and Walde, 2000, Gary-Bobo and Trannoy, 2004,
Kemnitz, 2007),
2 the link between the quality of educational provision, mobility costs and
student choice (Del Rey, 2001, De Fraja and Iossa, 2002, Del Rey and
Wauthy, 2006, Grazzini et al, 2011),
3 the allocation of academics’ time (Beath at al, 2003, Gauthier and Wauthy,
2007),
4 the impact of different funding systems (Beath et al, 2012).
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Introduction
Competition among universities in the presence of capacity
constraints
Our approach:
we assume the existence of capacities in the production of education,
a university can enroll beyond capacity but at a strictly convex cost
(Chowdhury, 2009, Jacqmin and Wauthy, 2014)
each university’s capacity level is chosen endogenously.
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Results
Results:
Bertrand competition always implies a lower capacity than Cournot
competition and the number of students enrolled in each university is greater
than the capacity level,
when costs are sufficiently convex, universities adopt a high level of fees in
Bertrand competition which can rise with the number of universities.
Conversely, Cournot competition leads to a higher number of students
enrolled than Bertrand competition,
under certain conditions, the equilibrium adopted in Bertrand competition
may be more efficient in terms of cost minimization than in Cournot
competition.
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The model
The utility function
In the same line as Jacqmin & Wauthy (2014), the objective function of
universities is specified as follows:
Max Ui (T ,R) (1)
with ∂Ui∂T > 0 and
∂Ui
∂R > 0
Students are required for the provision of education: the level of teaching is
equal to the enrollment of students ni weighted according to the parameter
0 < γ < 1:
T = γni
Students provide the funds a university needs to operate either directly
through fees (f ) or indirectly via the government (per-student subsidy s). R
represents each university’s expenditure on research. Here, the research output
Si depends only on the money invested in it:
R = Si
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The model
The cost function
The cost function of each university i is given by
Ci (ni , ki ) =
{
δki if 0 ≤ ni ≤ ki
δki + µ(ni − ki )2 if ni > ki (2)
where µ > 0. Cost parameters (δ and µ) are similar for all universities and
constant.
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The model
The optimization problem of a university i
The optimization problem of a university i is thus defined as:
Max Ui = γni + Si s.t. Si + δki + max(0;µ(ni − ki )2) = ni (fi + s) (3)
Universities are identical: there is no differentiation in curriculum, and/or in
other non-price dimensions (location, admission standard or financial
endowment...)
Universities are committed to satisfying all the demand they face once the
capacity level is chosen.
We assume that potential students will not differ in their willingness to enroll.
The student population is therefore normalized to the unit.
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The model
The optimization problem of a university i
The optimization problem of a university i is thus defined as:
Max Ui = γni + Si s.t. Si + δki + max(0;µ(ni − ki )2) = ni (fi + s) (3)
Universities are identical: there is no differentiation in curriculum, and/or in
other non-price dimensions (location, admission standard or financial
endowment...)
Universities are committed to satisfying all the demand they face once the
capacity level is chosen.
We assume that potential students will not differ in their willingness to enroll.
The student population is therefore normalized to the unit.
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The model
The Model
Sequential game in Cournot competition:
1 First stage: each university i chooses its level of capacity ki taking into
account the threshold capacity of other universities k−i ,
2 Second stage: each university i selects a number of students enrolled ni for a
given level of capacity ki and for a given number of students in the rival
university.
Consider the utility of university i in the second stage, conditional on ki :
Ui (ni ;Ni ; ki ) = ni ((1− ni − N−i ) + s + γ)− δki −max(0;µ(ni − ki )2)
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The model
The Model
Sequential game in Bertrand competition:
1 First stage: universities determine their capacity levels anticipating the effect
on the price equilibria in the second stage of the game.
2 Second stage: universities determine their tuition fees for a given capacity.
The utility function of each university can be rewritten:
Ui (fi , f−i , ki )
=

−δki if fi > fmin
(fi + γ + s)
N(fi )
m − δki −max(0;µ(N(fi )m − ki )2) = Ud(m) if fi = f−i
(fi + γ + s)N(fi )− δki −max(0;µ(N(fi )− ki )2) = UM(m) if fi < f−imin
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The model
Equilibria in the Cournot competition model
The symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium values are:
n∗c (m) > k
∗
c (m)
if and only if δ > δ
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The model
Equilibria in the Cournot competition model: comparative
statics
Impact of the different parameters on the equilibrium results:
∂n∗c
∂µ
< 0 if µ >
√
3
4
∂n∗c
∂δ
< 0 and
∂n∗c
∂γ
> 0 and
∂n∗c
∂s
> 0
Impact of the number of universities on the equilibrium results:
∂k∗c (m)
∂m
< 0
∂n∗c (m)
∂m
< 0 and
∂N∗c (m)
∂m
> 0
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The model
Equilibria in the Bertrand competition model
Proposition
In the second stage, (f1, f2, ..., fm) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if
f1(k1) = f2(k2) = ... = fm(km) = f
N(ki ), such that
If µ < mm−1 Case 1 If µ =
m
m−1 Case 2 If µ >
m
m−1 Case 3
f N = f¯ (ki ,m) =
µ(m+1)−m(γ+s)−2mµki
m+µm+µ
f N = f˜ (ki ,m) =
(m+1)−(m−1)(γ+s)−2mki
2m
f N = f ∗(ki ,m) =
m(1−γ−s)+2µ(1−mki )
2(m+µ)
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The model
Equilibria in the Bertrand competition model
Corollary
We verify that: ∀µ, γ, s, δ > 0 and m ≥ 3,
k¯∗b (m) < n¯
∗
b(m)
k˜∗b (m) < n˜
∗
b(m)
k∗b (m) < n
∗
b(m)
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The model
Equilibria in the Bertrand competition model: comparative
statics
Case 1: µ < mm−1
∂ f¯b
∂µ
> 0
∂k¯∗(m)
∂m
< 0 and
∂ f¯ ∗(m)
∂m
> 0
∂N¯∗(m)
∂m
< 0
Case 2 and 3: µ ≥ mm−1
∂f ∗b
∂µ
=
∂ f˜ ∗b
∂µ
= 0
∂k∗(m)
∂m
< 0 and
∂f ∗(m)
∂m
= 0
∂N∗(m)
∂m
= 0
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Comparison of equilibria
Comparison of equilibria: Cournot vs Bertrand
Proposition
∀γ, s, δ > 0 and m ≥ 2, we verify that:
The equilibrium level of capacity:
k∗b (m) < k
∗
c (m)
The total number of students enrolled:
1 if µ ≤ µ = 0.4589, N∗c (m) ≤ N∗b (m),
2 if µ > µ = 0.4589, N∗c (m) > N
∗
b (m).
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Comparison between equilibria with efficient solution
Because of the U-shaped average cost in k , there exists an efficient capacity
which minimizes the average cost:
MinniAC (ki , ni ) = Minni
[
C (ki , ni )
n
]
The capacity which minimizes the average cost for a given number of
students enrolled is:
kmin =
2µni − δ
2µ
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Comparison between equilibria with efficient solution
Proposition
The following table presents the comparison between the equilibrium results of the
two competition strategies with the efficient solution:
Cournot equilibrium
vs efficient solution
Bertrand equilibrium vs efficient solution
µ < mm−1 µ ≥ mm−1
capacities kminc < k
∗
c k
min
b > k
∗
b k
min
b = k
∗
b = k˜b
number of students/fees nminc < n
∗
c f
min
b < f
∗
b f
min
b = f
∗
b = f˜b
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Conclusion
Conclusion
Regarding our results:
Higher tuition in most countries which have adopted a deregulated system
can now be explained by our model,
Cournot competition is likely to induce too high a capacity level in terms of
the minimization of the average cost for the university,
Bertrand competition seems more efficient from this point of view but only if
the cost is sufficiently convex.
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Conclusion
Conclusion
Some limits and possible extensions:
the price elasticity of demand,
the access to financial support or other aids for students,
differentiation in curriculum, and/or other non-price dimensions,
student selection.
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